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THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN FOR OIL AND
GAS PIPELINES IN NEW MEXICO
With the increased use of oil and natural gas by industrial and
residental consumers, it is readily apparent that powers of eminent
domain granted to qualified pipeline companies will be of increasing
importance in New Mexico. The power of eminent domain granted
to pipeline companies differs from most condemnation procedures
in that condemnation for pipelines does not require a complete taking of the land;1 the owner of the land gives up only an easement
across his land. Pipelines are normally underground and must be
below normal plow depth through farm lands.2 The only inconveniences suffered by the landowner, be he private or public, are
those attending the construction of the pipeline and the continued
access for maintenance by the pipeline company.3
Condemnation of land for oil and gas pipelines in New Mexico
may be exercised by private corporations.4 Section 65-4-8,5 New
Mexico Statutes Annotated, provides that "any person" may exercise the right of eminent domain to acquire right of way for the
construction, operation, and maintenance of pipelines which carry
"petroleum, natural gas, and the products therefrom." ' Similar
statutes are found in thirty-four other jurisdictions.7
A pipeline company may resort to the exercise of this power only
if proper compensation cannot be agreed upon between the pipeline
company and the landowner, or if the landowner cannot be found.8
1. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-4-8 (1953) provides for the acquisition of necessary
right-of-way, nothing more.
2. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-4-5 (1953).
3. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-4-8 (1953).
4. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 65-4-1 to -14 (1953).
5. N.M. Stat. Ann. 65-4-8 (1953).
6. Ibid.
7. See Summers, Oil and Gas § 757 n.54 (1962), for a complete list of states having statutes dealing with the right of private pipelines to acquire land by condemnation. Most statutes provide that pipeline companies are to be considered common carriers. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-4-2 (1953). And most states extend their statutes
to include foreign as well as domestic corporations. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-4-8
(1953), where the words "any person, firm, association, or corporation" are used.
Some states provide procedures which are patterned after the Natural Gas Act
(see note 25 infra) in that no land may be condemned without receipt of a certificate
of convenience issued by a state agency. See Ind. Stat. Ann. § 54-723 (1951) where
the certificate is issued by the Indiana Public Service Commission.
8. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-9-1 (1953). Condemnation for pipelines is governed by
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The pipeline company must also meet minimum statutory requirements. 9
Since the New Mexico courts have not yet interpreted the provisions of this statute, it is the purpose of this Note to analyze and
criticize the statutes on the strength of decisions in other states
in order that a standard procedure might be formulated for future
reference. The problems discussed will include interpretation of the
term "public use," federal preemption of gas pipelines, and the
problems which must be met when crossing private, state, federal,
and Indian lands.

PUBLIC USE

Article 2, section 20 of the New Mexico Constitution provides
that no private property shall be taken under eminent domain or
damaged for public use without just compensation. Section 65-4-8
uses the terms "public uses and purposes."'0 Courts do not agree
on the definition of the term "public use." Although most courts
admit that there is no precise definition of the term," and that any
definition is ultimately a judicial question,' 2 they endeavor to establish a single definition. They divide jurisdictions into those following the "narrow," or "public use" view, and those following the
"broad" or "public benefit" view.'"
rules covering condemnation generally. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 22-9-1 to -29, 65-4-8
(1953).
9. Not all pipeline companies may exercise eminent domain. This Note will try
to answer the questions (1) which companies may exercise the right, and (2) what
constitutes the minimum statutory requirements which must be met.
10. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-4-8 (1953). (Emphasis added.)
11. 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain § 36, p. 660 (1962). See also Miller v. City of
Tacoma, 61 Wash. 2d 374, 378 P.2d 464, 470 (1953) where the court said:
The words 'public use' are neither abstractly nor historically capable of
complete definition. The words must be applied to the facts of each case
in the light of current conditions.
12. Questions as to whether the use to which the land is put is ultimately public
in character are judicial questions. State ex rel. Red River Valley Co. v. District Ct.
of Fourth Judicial Dist., 39 N.M. 523, 51 P. 2d 239 (1935) ; Cuglar v. Power Authority
of State of N.Y., 4 Misc. 2d 879, 163 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct. 1957) ; Superior Laundry
and Towel Supply Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 11 Ohio Ops. 2d 352, 168 N.E.2d 447
(1959).
Even if the legislature has initially decided that pipeline use is "public use," courts
may nevertheless determine the question for themselves. See Poole v. City of Kankakee,
406 Il. 521, 94 N.E.2d 416 (1950).
13. In addition to the terminology, "narrow" and "broad," many courts have referred to these views as the "public use" view, and the "public benefit" view. See
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"Public use" in New Mexico has been defined according to the
''narrow" or "orthodox" view. 4 This view considers a use public
only if the public is entitled as of right to use or enjoy the property
so condemned.' 5 Conversely, the "broad view" states that the condemnation and later use of the property need only be for the public
benefit or common good in order to be a public use.16
generally, Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20
B. U. L. Rev. 615 (1940) ; Note, 1 Buffalo L. Rev. 147 (1951) ; Note, 53 Mich. L. Rev.
882 (1955) ; Comment, 16 Md. L. Rev. 172 (1957). See also Annot., 54 A.L.R. 7 (1928).
A few courts have attempted to limit the definition according to the strict language
employed in their constitutions. See Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 91
S.E.2d 280, 282 (1956), where the court said: "In . . . other states the power of
eminent domain may be exercised for a public purpose, benefit or the public welfare,
as contrasted with the requirement of our constitution that it be for a public use." The
court concluded that its controlling decisions define public use to mean public use.
This rationale is spurious, however, since many states having constitutional provisions
relating to "public use" have defined the term broadly.
14. Only two cases in New Mexico have interpreted the term "public use" as it
appears in the New Mexico Constitution, and no New Mexico cases have interpreted
"public use" in regard to pipeline cases.
In Threlkeld v. Third Judicial Dist. Ct., 36 N.M. 350, 15 P.2d 671 (1932), the
court denied a lumber company's plan to construct a logging railroad in order that
lumber might be transported to distributors. The statutes relied upon by the court, N.M.
Laws 1905, ch. 97, §§ 20-21, are comparable to N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 22-9-1 to -38 (1953),
which deal with condemnation procedures generally. The court accepted the "generally recognized" meaning of public use, i.e., that public use meant public use and not
public benefit. It noted, however, by way of dictum, that "if there were a reasonable
showing of a public to be served, and of an ability and willingness to render service
as a common carrier, . . . [the lumber company] might prevail." Id. at 356, 15 P.2d
at 674.
The other case decided in New Mexico, Gallup Am. Coal Co. v. Gallup Southwestern Co., 39 N.M. 344, 47 P.2d 414 (1935), involved the constitutionality of a
statute which declared that the business of coal mining constituted a "public use."
The court held the statute unconstitutional, and reaffirmed the decision of the Threlkeld opinion, refusing to depart from the orthodox view of public use. As the court
noted, "Once we depart from the 'orthodox' view, we shall find no easy or logical
stopping place. Confusion and uncertainty will surround every battle between private
right and public benefit. . . ." Id. at 348, 47 P.2d at 416.
15. See Note, 23 Albany L. Rev. 386 (1959), for a collection of cases which follow
this view. According to Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent
Domain, 20 B. U. L. Rev. 615, 626 (1940), the narrow definition, which was at that
time on its way out, may be restated as follows: "To take property rights from A for
transfer to B or B's private enjoyment is not a public use, regardless of what ultimate
public purpose the transaction is intended to further."
Another example may be taken from a situation where eminent domain was
exercised to condemn a "blighted area" for urban re-development. The South Carolina
court ruled in this situation that "public use" and "public benefit" are not synonymous.
While acquisition of slum areas for conversion into (1) low cost housing units and
(2) light industrial sites may both be for "public benefit," only the former is a "public
use." Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956). See Comment,
16 Md. L. Rev. 172 (1957).
16. See Note, 23 Albany L. Rev. 386 (1959), for a collection of cases which follow
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Enlightened courts do not limit "public use" to a single definition
but look to the character of the case in which the term is used.' 7
Since the scope of the statute hinges upon the definition used, the
New Mexico court may either drastically restrict pipeline construction, or indiscriminately allow the construction of pipelines according to the definition which they adopt. For example, assume that
a pipeline company which will be called the Atlas Company developed a business transporting the oil and gas of all producers in
a series of oil fields by pipeline according to rates filed with the
Interstate Commerce Commission. Any use made of land taken by
eminent domain by the pipeline would be a public use, and the Atlas
Company would be allowed to exercise the right of eminent domain
under any definition which might be adopted. Now assume that
Atlas' competitor, the Baldwin Company, has developed a pipeline
system which services only the oil and gas produced from its parent
company's wells. Baldwin pipes oil and gas to refineries near major
cities which are extensive users of the refined products. The use put
to the land by the Baldwin Company cannot be "public use" under
this view. Contrary to reason, this view was espoused early in the nineteenth century
by at least one court. In an extremely lucid opinion, the Court of Chancery in New
Jersey argued for "public benefit" in 1832. The opinion, Scudder v. Trenton Del. Falls
Co., 1 N.J.Eq. 694 (Ch. 1832), which is set forth in part in Texas Pipe Line Co. v.
Snelbaker, 30 N.J. Super. 171, 103 A.2d 634 (1954), states:
[The term "public use" is not] limited to private corporations whose sole
object it is, to promote the public good. Such corporations are not to be found.
Private interest or emolument, is the primum mobile in all. The public interest
is secondary and consequential.
If to establish this as a public benefit, it be indispensably necessary that the
public should have the privilege of participating in it directly and immediately, then the proposition is not made out, and the defendants have no
authority. But is not this view too narrow? Can public improvements be
limited within such a compass? May we not, in considering what shall be
deemed a public use and benefit, look at the objects, the purposes, and the
results of the undertaking * * The varying condition of society is constantly presenting new objects of public importance and utility; and what
shall be deemed a public use or benefit, may depend somewhat on the situation and wants of the community for the time being.
Following this opinion, the court in Snelbaker concluded that there would be a "public
use" if there is a public benefit derived from service rendered which would be free
of unreasonable discrimination.
Generally public benefit is used as the test and "benefit has been held to mean
benefit of any considerable number of people; it is not necessary that the whole community or any large part of it should actually use or be benefited by the use." See, e.g.
Kansas City v. Liebi, 298 Mo. 569, 252 S.W. 404 (1923) ; State ex rel. Red River
Valley Co. v. District Ct. of Fourth Judicial Dist., 39 N.M. 523, 51 P.2d 239 (1935).
17. See Miller v. City of Tacoma, 61 Wash. 2d 374, 378 P.2d 464, 470 (1963)
Note, 53 Mich. L. Rev. 882 (1955).
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the "narrow" definition of that term, but it may result in public
benefit under the "broad" definition; any expropriation which tends
to increase utilization of resources and productive power is public
benefit and therefore has been held to be a public use.' 8 Infinite
variations may be added to the above hypothetical situations to
demonstrate the differences in definitions.
The Missouri Court of Appeals, in construing a statute very
similar to New Mexico's, 9 decided in 195420 that public use, when
applied to eminent domain down by pipeline companies, meant public benefit. Public benefit, in turn, was defined by the court to mean
"willingness to accept the trade of the general public, as distinguished from a refusal to do business with any but a selected or
limited clientele." ' 2' It was recognized that present needs, as well as
future demands which could reasonably be anticipated, must be
considered in determining what is "public use." Other courts also
stress the importance of considering the increasing wants and needs
22
of society in determining what is "public use."
When the definition of "public use" is litigated again in New
Mexico, arguments will be made by the proponents of the "narrow
view" to try to convince the New Mexico Supreme Court that "the
taking of property rights from A for transfer to B for B's private
enjoyment is not a public use, regardless of what ultimate public
purpose the transaction is intended to further. ' 23 Such an argument
has the weight of stare decisis. However, the arguments for a definition which would reflect the "public benefit" view are more persuasive and certainly more desirable. Future needs for oil and gas demand that a flexible definition be adopted. Limiting the use of property to a use which the public is entitled to as of right limits the
application of the statute.
If private pipelines are given the power of eminent domain, there
can be no purpose served by unduly limiting the exercise of that
power. No permanent damage is done to the lands crossed, yet untold benefits accrue to the public served by the pipeline. Public
benefit must logically be adopted as the test for public use.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
Twin
23.

See Note, Buffalo L. Rev. 147 (1951), for a discussion of such cases.
Bureau of Public Lands, Public Land Statistics (1962).
Phillips Pipe Line Co. v. Brandstetter, 263 S.W.2d 880 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954).
Id. at 886.
See Kansas City v. Liebi, 298 Mo. 569, 252 S.W. 404 (1923) ; State ex rel.
City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 N.W. 885 (1919).
Nichols, Public Use in Eminent Domain, 20 Boston U. L. Rev. 615, 626 (1940).
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II
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN OIL AND GAS PIPELINES

A4. Gas Pipelines
Oil pipelines were recognized as common carriers early in the
1920's under the Hepburn Act 2 4 and placed under the protection
of the Interstate Commerce Act. 25 Gas pipelines, however, were
expressly excepted from the operation of the Act. 2" After much discriminatory legislation over a twenty-year period by individual
states, 27 Congress passed the Natural Gas Act 28 which provided
rules and regulations for interstate transportation of natural gas
by pipelines. The purpose of the Act is to protect the public interest; 29 purchases by interstate pipeline companies from small unintegrated companies for resale for ultimate public consumption are
now controlled by the Act." In 1947, the Act was amended 8 1 to
give gas pipeline companies the power of eminent domain "where
any holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity cannot acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with the owner of
property to the compensation to be paid for, the necessary right-ofway to construct, operate, and maintain a pipeline. ' 32 The amendment provides that action may be maintained in the federal district
court or in the state court wherein the land is situated; jurisdiction
of federal district courts is limited to cases where landowners'
claims for compensation exceed $3,000.00.0.
Courts have had little trouble in concluding that such operations
24. 34 Stat. 584, 49 U.S.C. § 1(1) (a) (1958).
25. Part I, 24 Stat. 379, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1958).
Pipelines were put under statutory control because of two factors, large monopolistic
companies which operated pipelines, and discriminatory state legislation which interfered with expansion of commerce. See Summers, Oil and Gas § 756 (1962).
26. 34 Stat. 584,49 U.S.C. § 1(1) (a) (1958).
27. See Summers, op. cit. supra note 26, § 756, for a summary of state legislation of
gas pipelines and the effect of such legislation.
28. 52 Stat. 821, 15 U.S.C. § 717-717w (1958).
29. See Kentucky Natural Gas Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 159 F.2d 215
(6th Cir. 1947).

30. See Saturn Oil & Gas Co., Inc. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 250 F.2d 61 (10th
Cir. 1958).
31. Act of July 25, 1947, ch. 333, 61 Stat. 459, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (1958).

32. Ibid.
33.

Ibid.

In the case of Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 59 Ohio
Op. 282, 120

N.E.2d

143

(Columbiana

City P.Ct. 1953)

the court

answered

de-

fendant's contention that the pipeline company did not have a procedural right to
condemn land in that the companies are not authorized to do so by Ohio statutes, by
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are subject to the constitutional power of Congress to regulate

interstate commerce. 4 Judicial notice has been taken that the only
feasible method of transporting natural gas over long distances
is by pipeline.3 It is also well settled that Congress may delegate
the power of eminent domain to private corporations engaged in
public utility functions. 36 But may such delegation result in condemnation of state and private lands without state consent or compliance with state statutes? The amendment provides that "practice and procedure . . . in district courts of the United States . . .
shall conform as nearly as may be with practice and procedure in
. . . courts of the State where the property is situated." 3 7 A
saying that the State of Ohio may refuse consent to the use of its court, but it would
need to do so specifically.
See Williams v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 89 F. Supp. 485 (W.D.S.C.
1950). In an action to enjoin a pipeline company from proceeding in condemnation
actions, the plaintiffs argued that even though the pipeline company has been granted
the right to condemn its pipeline by the Natural Gas Act, it cannot enforce this right
in a South Carolina court because there is no specific statute providing for procedures
for condemnation for pipelines. The court rejected this argument. The court held
that "the right to condemn having been given by Congress in the field of interstate
commerce where it is supreme, all that is needed to make the grant effective is a State
court procedure which meets the requirements of due process and which can be reasonably utilized for the [pipeline company's] . . . purpose." 89 F. Supp. at 487. The
court argued that the pipeline company would be powerless if it did not have the
right to condemn in state court, since the prerequisite of a claim in excess of 3,000
to condemnation in a federal court would prohibit many suits if individual landowners refused the pipeline company access. The court concluded that it was "unwilling to conclude that Congress accomplished such a futility when it passed the Natural
Gas Act." 89 F. Supp. at 488.
34. See the Pipeline Cases, 234 U.S. 548 (1914) ; Thatcher v. Tennessee Gas
Transmission Co., 180 F.2d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1950).
35. In Thatcher v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., supra note 34, the court
noticed that
vast reserves of natural gas are located in States of our nation distant from
other States which have no similar supply, but do have a vital need of the
product; and that the only way this natural gas can be feasibly transported
from one State to another is by means of a pipeline. None of the means of
transportation by water, land, or air, to which mankind has successively
become accustomed, suffices for the movement of natural gas.
180 F.2d at 647.
36. Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525 (1893) ; Cherokee Nation v.
So. Kansas Ry Co., 135 U.S. 641 (1879) ; Thatcher v. Tennessee Gas Transmission
Co., 180 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1950). See 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 2.15 (1961).
In Thatcher, the landowner contended that the power granted by the federal
government resulted in private taking for private use, and that the power of eminent
domain was reserved exclusively to the states by the Tenth Amendment, United
States Constitution. The court did not accept either argument but held that pipelines
subject to the Natural Gas Act are declared to be public businesses subject to public
control.
37. Act of July 25, 1947, ch. 333, 61 Stat. 459, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (1958).
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majority of courts which have passed upon this question have concluded that compliance with state regulations would defeat the
"uniformity of regulation and control by a single agency" 38 which
is necessary to gain benefit under the Act. The New Mexico Supreme
Court has reviewed one case brought in a New Mexico state court
under authority of the Natural Gas Act.3 9 The court summarized
the procedure followed but did not consider any procedural problems.40 As a general rule, it may be stated that state court procedures will be followed where such procedures do not contravene
the Act.
A pipeline company qualified to exercise the power of eminent41
domain under the Natural Gas Act need not be a common carrier,
but is only required to be engaged in the transportation of natural
gas across state lines by pipeline. 42 The Federal Power Commission
may, in its discretion, issue the company a certificate of public convenience which the pipeline company must have before exercising
38. Parkes v. Natural Gas Pipe Line Co. of America, 207 Okla. 91, 249 P.2d 462,
467 (1952). In Parkes, the pipeline company did not comply with the laws of Oklahoma prior to action to condemn land. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that
where the Oklahoma statute, which required that all pipelines be common carriers,
was in conflict with the federal legislation and grants of power, the federal legislation must control in all matters concerning interstate commerce. The court concluded
that such authority is not dependent upon the consent of states.
See Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 59 Ohio Op. 282,
120 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Columbiana City P.Ct. 1953), where the court held that
"action in the form of the Natural Gas Act certainly preempts this field."
But see Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Schmidt, 108 N.Y.S.2d 435 (Erie County
Ct. 1951), where the court held that gas companies had to conform to New York condemnation law as well as the federal Natural Gas Act. The court reasoned that the
proceeding was one "in rem and * * the procedure under the New York State
Condemnation Law is to be followed."
39. Transwestern Pipe Line Co. v. Yandell, 69 N.M. 448, 367 P.2d 938 (1961).
40. Transwestern Pipe Line Co. v. Yandell, supra note 39, arose out of a natural
gas company's attempt to acquire land for pipelines under the power of eminent
domain in the Natural Gas Act. The New Mexico court said, "after filing of notice
of suit and bond, the court, in accordance with our Eminent Domain Statutes,
§§ 22-9-1 to 22-9-38, 1953 Comp., appointed commissioners to assess the damages sustained by the several respondents."
The court considered only the issue of damages under the above statutory proceedings.
41. 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1958) specifically excepts pipelines operating under authority
of the Natural Gas Act from the requirement that "pipelines shall be constructed,
operated, and maintained as common carriers." See note 7 supra and accompanying
text.
For examples of cases involving pipelines which are not common carriers, see
Parks v. Natural Gas Pipe Line Co. of America, 207 Okla. 91, 249 P.2d 462 (1952)
Thatcher v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 180 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1950).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (1958).
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its right of eminent domain under the statute. 43 The problem of
defining "public use" is non-existent under the Act. Congress decided
that the regulation of interstate commerce of natural gas "is necessary in the public interest;"' 44 requirements were laid down by Congress for taking for "public use." 45 Federal decisions uniformly
hold that
granted a valid public purpose to be furthered by condemnation,
a determination by the condemnor of the necessity of a certain taking to carry out the 46public purpose is conclusive and cannot be
examined by the court.

in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or
This principle is conclusive
47
gross abuse of discretion.
B. Oil Pipelines
4
The right of pipeline companies, both domestic and foreign, 8
to exercise their right of eminent domain depends upon a showing
that the owner of the land in question either cannot agree with the
pipeline company on the compensation to be paid, is incapable of
contracting, or cannot be found. 49 The court, after a petition is
filed, may appoint three commissioners to assess the damages sustained. 50 The placement of pipelines is controlled by the language
of section 65-4-8 which states "that pipelines shall be so located
as to do the least damage to private or public property consistent
with proper use and economical construction." 51 Depth of pipe43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Parkes v. Natural Gas Pipe Line Co. of America, 207 Okla. 91, 249 P.2d 462
(1952).
46. Williams v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 89 F. Supp. 485, 489
(W.D.S.C. 1950). The court held that the quoted material is a corollary of the principle that
when the Legislature provides for the taking of private property for a public
use it may either prescribe specifically the property that may be taken, or
delegate that determination to the agency, either public or private, which is
charged with developing the public use.
Since findings of the Federal Power Commission are by nature those of an administrative agency, they are deemed conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. See
Kentucky Natural Gas Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 159 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1947).
47. Ibid. See 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain § 108 (1938).
48. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-4-8 (1953).
49. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-9-1 (1953).
50. Ibid.
51. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-4-8 (1953).
See note 46 cupra. The court, in Williams v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.,
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369

lines, 52 construction under highways and railroads,5" and placement
in municipalities 54 are also specifically limited by statute.
As stated earlier,5 5 the federal government has long considered
oil pipelines, as opposed to gas pipelines, to be under the power of
the Interstate Commerce Commission. 6 The Commission has power
to regulate the operation of the pipelines.5 7 At present, however,
there has been no declaration by the Supreme Court that Congress
intends to occupy the field. Congress and the courts have allowed
the states to retain control over acquisition of lands by oil pipelines,
where the state discriminates against interstate
except of course
s
commerce.
III
PROCEDURAL DIFFERENCES-LANDS INVOLVED

Immediately above, the procedures for condemnation have been
laid out generally with condemnation of private land in mind. In
New Mexico, however, a great portion of land is held by the state,
the federal government, or by Indian tribes and pueblos.5 The
procedures involved when acquiring land from each of these differ
markedly.
J. Privateand State Lands
Thus far in the discussion, the procedures discussed have been
those generally followed when condemning private lands in the
state. State lands are included within the eminent domain provisions
of section 65-4-8; the section speaks of "damage to private or public property" and of "the right to enter upon the lands and property
89 F. Supp. 485 (W.D.S.C. 1950), refused to grant injunctive relief claimed by a
landowner. They held that a landowner may not object merely because some other
location might have been made or some other property condemned.
Decisions like this under the Natural Gas Act are of little import since Congress
specified that state laws are to be complied with wherever possible. See note 33 supra.
52. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-4-5 (1953).
53. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 65-4-11 to -13 (1953).
54. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-4-7 (1953).
55. See notes 25-26 supra, and accompanying text.
56. See note 26 supra, and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Phillips Pipe Line Co. v. Brandstetter, 263 S.W.2d 880 (Mo. App.
1954).
58. See Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911), where a statute
which allowed the exercise of eminent domain by corporations engaged wholly in
business within the state and denied it under similar conditions to corporations engaged
in interstate commerce was held unconstitutional.
59. Bureau of Public Lands, Public Land Statistics (1962).
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of the state and of private persons and of private and public corporations." 60 Although no cases involve the taking of state land by
an individual for private use, the Supreme Court of New Mexico
would probably allow such a taking under the language of the
statute. The only thing which might give them pause would be the
provision in Article 2, section 20, which states "private property
shall not be taken . . . for public use without just compensation.''6 This provision, however, merely insures private landowners
that they will be recompensed for all losses by exercise of eminent
domain; nothing in the section would limit the exercise of eminent
domain to private lands.
B. Indian Lands
Historically, Indian lands have been protected by the government of the United States.6 2 Even after allowing Indians to take title
to lands held as reservations or pueblos, the United States retained
an interest in the land in the form of a restriction against alienation
for the protection of Indians. 6 3 Alienation is restricted in order to
protect the Indians, "a simple, uninformed people, ill-prepared to
cope with the intelligence and greed of other races," 6 * against the
loss of their lands by improvident dispositions. The restrictions
continue to apply today, and have influenced all legislation involving tribal and pueblo lands, and lands allotted in severalty to Indians.
Congress, amid a mass of legislation dealing with rights-of-way
for public utilities and private companies across the public domain,
national parks, and all reservations under the control of the federal
government,6 5 passed two acts dealing specifically with rights-of-way
66
across Indian lands.
60. N.M. Stat. Ann. §65-4-8 (1953).
61. N.M. Const., art. 2, § 20.
62. See note 63 infra.
63. See, e.g., State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. United States, 148 F. Supp.
508 (D.N.M. 1957), where the court held that there are certain characteristics concerning the title to Indian lands which are common in all Indian titles. These are: (1)
certain possessory rights are always granted to Indians, sometimes jointly, sometimes
severally; (2) the United States retains certain restraint on alienation of the land;
the United States has a reserved "approval power"; (3) a relationship of guardianward or trustee-beneficiary results from grants by the United States to Indians.
64. United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1910).
65. See United States v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 127 F.2d 349 (10th Cir.
1942), for a partial collection of statutes providing for rights-of-way across public
lands.
66. Act of March 3, 1901, ch. 832, § 3, 31 Stat. 1084, 25 U.S.C. § 357 (1958) ; Act
of March 11, 1904, ch. 505, 33 Stat. 65, 25 U.S.C. § 321 (1958).
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NO TES

Under 25 U.S.C. § 32 1,67 the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to grant rights-of-way for the construction, operation and
maintenance of oil and gas pipelines. His authority extends to lands
held by Indian tribes, lands allotted in severalty to individual Indians, and to lands reserved for Indian agencies or schools. The
Secretary determines the amount of compensation to be paid for
the rights-of-way;68 the Secretary may, where no State or Territorial taxes apply, demand that taxes be paid for the benefit of
the Indians involved.6 9
Under 25 U.S.C. § 357,70 Congress has provided that lands
allotted in severalty to Indians may be condemned for "public purposes" under the law of the state wherein the land is situated.
Money awarded as damages must be paid directly to the allottee.
Private corporations exercising the right to condemn Indian lands
under state law under § 357 do not need the approval or permission
of the Secretary of the Interior before proceeding with the condemnation, 71 but have to include the Secretary as an indispensable
party to the action.72 The interest of the Secretary of the Interior
has been said to be limited to:
the protection of the Indian ward against the alienation of any part
of his land without the payment of just compensation therefor,
73
and to safeguard his substantial rights under the applicable law.

These sections do not contradict each other, but, according to the
courts, are merely examples of two methods which may be used for
67. 33 Stat. 65, 25 U.S.C. § 321 (1958).
68. Ibid. The exact language of the section reads:
The compensation to be paid the tribes in their tribal capacity and the individual allottees for such right of way through their lands shall be determined in such manner as the Secretary of the Interior may direct, and shall
be subject to his final approval.
69. Ibid. According to the language of the section, where the pipelines are not
subject to State or Territorial taxation, the owner of the pipelines shall pay the
Secretary of the Interior, for the benefit of the Indians involved, an amount set by
the Secretary, not to exceed $5.00 for each ten miles of line.
70. 31 Stat. 1084, 25 U.S.C. § 357 (1958).
71. Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939). The Supreme Court held that
authorization to condemn land confers by implication permission to sue the United
States.
72. Ibid. The Court held that the Secretary is an indispensable party because, "In
its capacity as trustee for the Indians it is necessarily interested in the outcome of the
suit-in the amount to be paid." 305 U.S. at 388. The Secretary is also interested in
what shall be done with the proceeds, since the money may be used for re-investment

purposes.
73. United States v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. 127 F.2d 349, 355 (10th Cir. 1942).
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the acquisition of easements across allotted Indian lands. 74 Pipeline companies may request rights-of-way under § 321 and, if refused, initiate condemnation actions under § 357. When dealing
with lands other than allotted Indian lands, however, § 357 must be
used.
C. Public Lands
Rights-of-way through the public lands, including the forest reserves of the United States, may be granted by the Secretary of the
Interior, for pipeline purposes for the transportation of oil or
natural gas to any applicant possessing [necessary] qualification. .... 7.
Before an application for right-of-way will be considered by the
Secretary, the applicant must show (1) that he is a citizen of the
United States or a corporation organized under the laws of the
United States or any state or territory, 76 (2) that the pipeline will
77
be constructed, operated, and maintained as a common carrier,
and (3) that the applicant will purchase and/or transport oil and
gas produced from government lands in amounts deemed reason78
able by the Secretary.
These requirements impose a burden of "common carriers" on
all oil and gas pipelines not covered under the Natural Gas Act.70
This differs from the result which would be obtained under the
"public benefit" test. By this view, a pipeline on private land would
not have to be a common carrier ifit served the public benefit.
74. Nicodemus v. Washington Water Power Co., 264 F.2d 614, 618 (9th Cir. 1959)

the court dealt with the section involving electrical power lines [25 U.S.C. §§ 323, 357
(1958)] and concluded:
So considered, each of these sections is an effective and reasonable provision
in the procedure for the acquisition of a right of way, neither dependent
upon the other.
75. Act of February 25, 1920, ch. 85, § 28, 41 Stat. 449, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1958), as
amended.
76. 41 Stat. 437, 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1958), as amended.
77. 41 Stat. 449, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1958), as amended.
78. Ibid. The section states:
[Ciommon carriers . . . shall accept, convey, transport, or purchase without discrimination, oil and natural gas produced from Government lands in
the vicinity of the pipe line in such proportionate amounts as the Secretary of
the Interior may, after full hearing with due notice thereof to the interested
parties and a proper finding of facts, determine to be reasonable.
79. Ibid. See notes 25-33 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of requirements under the Natural Gas Act.
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CONCLUSION

The differences which have been enumerated in discussing the
types of land over which pipelines must pass in New Mexico may be
minimized if the modern or "public benefit" view is adopted when
the New Mexico courts are called upon to define "public use."
Where public lands are involved, the Secretary of the Interior has
discretion to grant rights-of-way for oil and gas pipelines, which
discretion is not limited by any strict "public use" requirement.80 In
addition, where allotted Indian lands are involved, the decision of
the Secretary is not exclusive. 8 ' Pipeline companies may wish to
bring condemnation actions in state courts or in federal courts,
where the laws of the state in which the land is situated will be
applied whenever possible. 2
After surmounting the "public use" hurdle, other limitations
divide themselves into only two questions: (1) Is the pipeline a
common carrier, or by statute considered a common carrier?; and
(2) Is the pipeline if a gas pipeline, eligible to exercise its rights
under the Natural Gas Act? If the answers to these questions are
''yes," any pipeline may exercise the power of eminent domain,
whether under state statute or under federal enactment.
RICHARD L. GERDINGt

80.
81.

See note 78 infra, and accompanying text.
See note 70 infra, and accompanying text.

82. Ibid.
t Member, Board of Editors, 1963-64.

